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lation on the subject.2 5 And, as was noted by the Virginia court in the
Chesapeake and Ohio case, attempts by Congressmen and Senators to
amend the section to make it inoperative in those states which have the
"Right to Work" laws were defeated by large majorities.2 6
The conclusion is rather inevitable that the patent intent of Congress
was that the 1951 amendment should prevail over any state laws to the
contrary. The trend of decisions surveyed here has been to recognize
that conclusion and to apply the amendment in spite of laws of the state
prohibiting union shop agreements. Whether to permit union shop con-
tracts, and how to regulate them, is.a problem to which neither the
states nor Congress have found a clear-cut, definitive solution, and the
states and Congress have taken varying positions with respect to it over
a period of years. Undoubtedly there will be further legislation on the
subject in the future.2 T Until there is further legislation, the 1951
amendment is the law of the land, and state "Right to Work" laws in
conflict must yield to the Congressional Act.
28
JAMES ALBERT HousE, JR.
Adverse Possession-Intent as a Requisite in Mistaken Boundary
Cases
In a recent Texas case,' the court, in denying defendant's claim of
title by adverse possession, reaffirmed the Texas rule as regards the in-
tent necessary to acquire title by adverse possession in cases where there
2' "It will be noted that the proposed paragraph eleventh would authorize agree-
ments notwithstanding the laws of any state. For the following reasons, among
others, it is the view of the committee, that if, as a matter of national policy such
agreements are to be permitted in the railroad industries it would be wholly im-
practicable and unworkable for the various states to regulate such agreements.
Railroads and airlines are direct instrumentalities of interstate commerce; the
Railway Labor Act requires collective bargaining on a system-wide basis; agree-
ments are uniformly negotiated for an entire railroad system and regulates the
rates of pay, rules of working conditions of employees in many states, the duties
of many employees require the constant crossing of state lines; many seniority
districts under labor agreements extend across state lines, and in the exercise of
their seniority rights employees are frequently required to move from one state
to anothe:.' H. R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
The Senate Committee report stated that there was no disagreement that the
right of unions generally in industry to enter into union shop contracts should be
extended to labor organizations subject to the Railway Labor Act; but three
members of the Committee reserved the right to introduce and support amend-
ments on the floor, premised on asserted differencs between the provisions of the
amendment and corresponding provisions of Taft-Hartley. The majority felt
that the terms of the two Acts were substantially the same, and "such differences
as exist are warranted either by experience or by special conditions existing among
employees of our railroads and airlines." SEN. REP. No. 2262., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
2 See 96 CoNG. REc. 536 (1951).
27 For varying state and federal legislation on the subject, see MATTHEWS,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 475 et seq. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1953).
" See discussion of Allen v. Southern Ry., 114 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. N. C. 1953),
note 7 supra.
'Orlando v. Moore, 274 S. W. 2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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is a mistake in the boundary line between two adjacent landowners.
The court said:
"Where one of two adjacent landowners extends his fence,
through mere inadvertence or ignorance of the location of the
true boundary line, so as to embrace within his enclosure lands
belonging to his neighbor, with no intent of claiming such ex-
tended area, but with intent of claiming adversely only to the true
boundary line, wherever it may be, his possession of such ex-
tended area is not adverse or hostile to the true owner."2
The courts are in sharp disagreement as to the requisite intent neces-
sary to acquire title through adverse possession. The purpose here is
to compare the several rules applied, with particular emphasis on North
Carolina decisions, in order to arrive at the most practical solution to
this frequently occurring problem of boundary disputes.
The leading case of French v. Pearce3 laid down the rule that the
visible possession, with intent to possess, is the controlling factor.
Whether the possession is with intent to disseize the owner or is merely
under a mistake of ownership is immaterial. So long as the possessor
holds the land as his own, he may acquire the fee through adverse pos-
session. This view seems to be followed in the majority of jurisdic-
tions.4
A second view, as stated in the early Iowa case of Grube v. Wells,5
requires the possession to be consciously hostile before a possessor may
acquire title by adverse possession. Under this view, unless the posses-
sor knows that he is holding adversely and intends to do so, his posses-
2 Id. at 89.
38 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831).
' Milstead v. Devine, 254 Ala. 442, 48 So. 2d 530 (1950) ; Park v. Powers, 2 Cal.
2d 590, 42 P. 2d 75 (1935) ; Vade v. Suhler, 118 Colo. 236, 195 P. 2d 390 (1921) ;
Searles v. DeLadson, 81 Conn. 133, 70 Atl. 589 (1890) ; Manuel v. Barley Mill
Road Home, 104 A. 2d 908 (Del. 1954); Bridges v. Brackett, 205 Ga. 637, 54
S. E. 2d 642 (1949) ; Calkins v. Kausouros, 72 Idaho 150, 237 P. 2d 1053 (1951) ;
Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N. E. 2d 640 (1942) ; Sattler v. Pellichino,
71 So. 2d 689 (La. 1954); Hub Bel Air v. Hirsch, 203 Md. 637, 102 A. 2d 550(1954); Locks and Canals v. Nashua and L. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1 (1870); May
v. Maurer, 339 Mich. 115, 62 N. W. 2d 455 (1954) ; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167
Minn. 356, 209 N. W. 257 (1926) ; Alexander v. Hyland, 214 Miss. 348, 58 So. 2d
826 (1952) ; State ex- rel. Edie v. Sham, 348 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. 2d 174 (1941) ;
Carman v. Hewitt, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Hallow~ell v. Borchers,
150 Neb. 322, 34 N. W. 2d 404 (1948) ; Yetzer v. Thoman, 17 Ohio St. 130,
91 Am. Dec. 122 (1866); Johnson v. Whelan, 186 Okla. 511, 98 P. 2d 1103(1940) ; Liberto v. Steele, 188 Tenn. 529, 221 S. W. 2d 701 (1949) ; Menzer v.
Tracy, 247 Wis. 245, 19 N. W. 2d 257 (1945) ; Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo.
49_4, 273 Pac. 908 (1929). In Patterson v. Wilmont, 245 S. W. 2d 116, 121 (Mo.1952), the court said: "It is not necessary that he intend to take away from the
owner something which he knows belongs to another, or even that he be indiffer-
ent as to the facts of the legal title. It is the intent to possess, and not the intent
to take irrespective of his right which governs."
'34 Iowa 148 (1871).
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sion cannot be adverse. This view has been repudiated in Iowa and
seems to be virtually abandoned as a rule of law.7
A third view, as laid down by Preble v. Maine Central R. R.,8 is that
if the party occupies to a fence beyond his boundary, believing it to be
the true line, but with no intent to claim title if it be ascertained that
the fence was on his neighbor's land, he cannot acquire title by adverse
possession. The reason given is that the requisite intent to claim title
exists only upon the condition that the fence be on the true boundary
line. If, however, his intent is to claim title whether it shall eventually
be found to be the correct boundary or not, then the possession is ad-
verse. This is the view followed in the principal case9 and in many ju-
risdictions.'10
The North Carolina decisions appear to be inconsistent as to the rule
to be applied in mistaken boundary cases. The case of Locklear v.
Savage," a frequently cited case in the field of adverse possession, lays
down the rule as to the requirements necessary to hold adversely: The
possession must be actual, open, decided, and as notorious as the prop-
erty will admit, indicating an assertion of exclusive ownership and an
intent to exercise dominion over it against all claimants. It is readily
apparent that this definition of adverse possession could be interpreted
to include cases of mistaken boundary where the possessor thought the
land was his and exercised dominion over it. However, the cases have
not so held.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined the requisite intent
as being "the intent to claim, against the true owner, which renders the
entry and possession adverse.' 2 This language seems to indicate that
it is necessary that the person holding the land have knowledge that it
is not his land in order for him to hold adversely. This interpretation
was followed in Price v. Whisnant,13 where the court said that if the
'The Grube case was expressly overruled by Lawrence v. Washburn, 119
Iowa 109, 93 N. W. 73 (1903).
See, however, Price v. Whisnant, 236 N. C. 381, 72 S. E. 2d 851 (1952) and
Westland Realty Corp. v. Griffin, 151 Va. 1005, 145 S. E. 718 (1928), where the
courts seemed to apply the rule of the Grube case.
'85 Me. 260 (1893).
' Orlando v. Moore, 274 S. W. 2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
"Tanner v. Dobbins, 255 Ala. 671, 53 So. 2d 549 (1951); Davis v. Wright,
220 Ark. 743, 249 S. W. 2d 979 (1952) ; Shaw v. Williams, 50 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
1951) ; Patrick v. Chency, 226 Iowa -853, 285 N. W. 855 (1939) ; Wilson v. Pum
Ze, 167 Kan. 31, 204 P. 2d 723 (1949) ; Traylor v. West, 255 S. W. 2d 612 (Ky.
1953) ; Landry v. Giguere, 127 Me. 264, 143 Atl. 1 (1928) ; Warner v. Noble, 286
Mich. 654, 282 N. W. 855 (1939); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Cash, 67 Mont. 585,
216 Pac. 782 (1923) ; Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N. C. 255, 63 S. E. 2d 630 (1951) ;
Newton v. McKeel, 142 Ore. 674, 21 P. 2d 206 (1933) ; Bettack v. Conachen, 235
Wis. 559, 294 N. W. 57 (1940).11159 N. C. 236, 74 S. E. 347 (1912).
12 Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 N. C. 11, 13, 94 S. E. 703, 704 (1918) ; Parker
v. Banks, 79 N. C. 480, 485 (1878).13236 N. C. 381, 72 S. E. 2d 851 (1952).
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possessor thought his deed covered the disputed area, his possession was
not adverse, but a claim of rightful ownership. This is the view of the
Grube case.
In Gibson v. Dudley,14 plaintiff took possession of a driveway on the
side of his lot, thinking the driveway belonged to him. He used the
driveway for the requisite time to acquire title by adverse possession.
The court, however, denied his claim, and said that it was not one of
adverse possession, but of rightful ownership. The fact that plaintiff
thought the driveway was his own prevented him from acquiring it by
adverse possession. This case would also seem to be an example of the
Grube view. 15
Only one year prior to the Gibson case, the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld a claim of adverse possession for the defendant, although
she testified that it was never her intention of claiming anything except
what she owned. 16 This case would tend to support the view of the
French case.
But to confuse the picture even further in North Carolina, the court
has quoted with approval the doctrine of the Preble case to the effect
that "where the occupation of the land is by a mere mistake, and with
no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own land which
does not belong to him, but he intends to claim only to the true line,
wherever it may be, the holding is not adverse." 17  In this case, plain-
tiff testified that he had no intention of holding any land which did not
belong to him; but the court held that there was adverse possession be-
cause plaintiff asserted the boundary to be at a certain place and claimed
it as his own, even if there was a mistake. It appears that here the
court applied the Preble view.
A discussion of the North Carolina decisions would not be com-
plete without a brief mention of the firmly established doctrine to the
effect that if there is but a "slight encroachment" and the jury finds the
encroachment to be inadvertently or unintentionally made, and that the
purpose was to run the fence on the true line, the possession of the
small extra strip is permissive, and not adverse.' 8  One North Carolina
14233 N. C. 255, 63 S. E. 2d 630 (1951).
" The court said, however, that when the plaintiff first went into possession,
he was claiming and intended to claim, only that which he had purchased. Id. at
257, 63 S. E. 2d at 631.
" Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232 N. C. 236, 60 S. E. 2d 101 (1950). This case
may be distinguished on the ground that there was a lappage question and the
defendant was claiming adverse possession of land which her deed actually in-
cluded.
" Dawson v. Abbott, 184 N. C. 192, 195, 114 S. E. 15, 16 (1922). Quoted from
1 Cyc., Adverse Possessiont § VI(E) (1901).
1" Waldo v. Wilson, 173 N. C. 689, 92 S. E. 693 (1917); Blue Ridge Land
Co. v. Floyd, 171 N. C. 543, 88 S. E. 862 (1916) ; Currie v. Gilchrist, 147 N. C.
648, 61 S. E. 581 (1908) ; McLean v. Smith, 106 N. C. 172, 11 S. E. 184 (1890);
King v. Wells, 94 N. C. 344 (1886) ; Gilchrist v. McLaughlin, 29 N. C. 310 (1847);
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case held that an encroachment of twenty-five yards is of sufficient
notoriety to be adverse. 9
Adverse possession statutes "rest on a wise public policy, which
regards litigation with disfavor and aims at the repose of conditions
which the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to
indicate their acquiescence therein. °20 This public policy can best be
realized by allowing one who has held the land for the statutory period
to acquire the fee thereto.
To rely on an intent to dispossess, as is required by the view of
Grube v. Wells,21 would necessarily reward dishonesty, whereas the
honest, mistaken possessor would be penalized.
It is submitted that the view of Preble v. Maine Central R. R.,
22
which is followed in the principal case, is too theoretical to be workable.
"Neither the courts nor anyone else can tell or conjecture what the
party might have intended to do in the event he discovered later that
he had been mistaken as to the true line."'23 The possibility of the land
belonging to someone else probably never occurs to the possessor in mis-
take cases, and therefore the test fails. It would seem that the intent,
if acquird at all in cases under this test, is acquired after the possessor
has learned of his mistake and consulted his lawyer.
Mistaken belief of the possessor should be immaterial, and the courts
should allow what actually happened to govern. 24 The best view in
mistaken boundary cases is the view as laid down in French v. Pearce,25
that is, that visible possession, regardless of whether it be under a mis-
taken belief of ownerhip, will constitute adverse possession.
Under the view of the French case, here advocated, one holding for
the requisite time would not lose the land by innocently stating at the
trial that he did not intend to take what was not his. Nor would it be
necessary to speculate as to what intent, if any, was in the mind of the
possessor when he took possession, many years previously.
Bynum v. Carter, 26 N. C. 310 (1844) (The court, by way of dictum at page 314,
said: "We admit there may be cases in which the possession may be of so
minute a part of the disputed land as not to amount to an ouster of the owner,
being regarded, rather, as an inadvertent encroachment without a claim of right, or
as permissive and not adverse. But in such cases, the conclusion does not arise
from the supposition that the owner was actually ignorant of the fact of the
possession or of its extent, but that the other party did not intend to usurp a
possession beyond the boundaries to which he had a good title.") ; Green v. Har-
mon, 15 N. C. 158 (1833).
" Mode v. Long, 64 N. C. 433 (1870).
2 1 Am. JuR., Adverse Possession § 4 at p. 794 (1936).
2134 Iowa 148 (1871).
2285 Me. 260 (1893).
22 Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 295, 105 Pac. 1066, 1068 (1909).
24 See Note, 3 VAND. L. REv. 337 (1950), where the writer approved the view
urged here.
28 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831).
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Finally, adoption of the French view would tranmute the seemingly
irreconcilable rules existing in North Carolina today into one practicable,




In the recent case Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co.,1 plaintiff em-
ployee was sent out on the road to change two flat tires on one of de-
fendant's trucks. After replacing the old tubes, it became necessary to
obtain air to inflate the tires, so plaintiff drove along the highway until
he found a service station open. He asked and received permission from
the man in charge to use the air hose. Before he inflated the first tire,
plaintiff was asked to assist in pushing off the stalled car of a customer
of the station. Plaintiff acceded to this request and, while pushing, was
struck and injured by an approaching car.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission awarded compensation
on the ground that there was an injury arising out of and in the course
of the employment.2 The supreme court affirmed the award, rejecting
the contentions that the plaintiff had deviated from the course of his
employment, and that the hazard was not peculiar to the employment.3
The main reasons given for the holding were that the response of the
plaintiff was natural and reasonable; that he had reasonable grounds
to believe that his acts were incidental to his employment and bene-
ficial to his employer; and that if the employer had been present he
would have instructed the employee to render the assistance. Under
the circumstances, the aid received from the service station and the aid
given by plaintiff were said to be so closely interwoven that the injury
"- For excellent discussions on the problem here presented, see: Johnson v.
Whelan, 186 Okla. 511, 98 P. 2d 1103 (1940), and Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39
Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908 (1929) with annotation in 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
1241 N. C. 448, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955).
- The term "arising out of" refers to the cause or origin of the accident, and
"in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
accident occurred. Taylor v. Wake Forest, 228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947) ;
Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942) ; Ashley v. F-W
Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. 2d 834 (1942). See also Note, 10 N. C. L.
REv. 373 (1932).
'If the risk involved is one to which all others in the general area are sub-jected, as distinguished from a hazard peculiar to the employee's work, the re-
sulting injury is not compensable. Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724,
24 S. E. 2d 751 (1943); Plemmons v. White's Service, 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E.
370 (1938). The court in the present case said, "Plaintiff, while pushing the
car onto and along the highway, subjected himself to a hazard not common to all
others in the neighborhood but peculiar to the task in which he was engaged."
Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 448, 454, 85 S. E. 2d 596, 601 (1955).
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